| 日時 | 2026年12月8日（火） 15時～16時40分 |
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| 場所 | ハイブリッド開催（センター会議室（ 赤門総合研究棟5F ）／オンライン（Zoom）） |
| 題目 | Does Lifting Coercion Lift the Economy? |
| 報告者 | David Yang (Harvard University) |
| 使用言語 | 英語 |
報告要旨
State coercion in land and labor markets is typically viewed as a barrier to development, yet it has often coincided with rapid growth. We argue that such coercion is best evaluated through the factor prices it manipulates, whose aggregate consequences depend on pre-existing misallocation. We examine a 2014 judicial reform in China that transferred control over local courts' finances and personnel to provincial authorities, constraining local governments' coercive power. Exploiting its staggered rollout across prefectures and data ranging from 140 million court judgments to 195 million business registrations, we report three sets of findings. First, citizens' win rates in land and labor disputes rise by 17.6 percent, and land and labor prices rise even in transactions that never reach court. Second, firm entry shifts from land- and labor-intensive sectors toward technology-intensive ones. Third, the aggregate consequences hinge on ex ante wedges in factor allocation: where technology-intensive production was short of capital, reallocation raises productivity growth; elsewhere, comparable price changes lower it. Taken together, our findings suggest that the consequences of constraining coercion depend on which factor prices it moves and on the allocation from which it moves them.
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| 問合せ先 | 社会科学研究所 広報室（kouhou [at]iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp） [at]を＠に置き換えてください |
